The Third Division of the Third Republic of Poland
- Paweł Konzal
- Sep 17
- 4 min read
Poland has been ruled by divisions lasting 15-20 years. These divisions are meta-themes, dominating discussions and more important in the hierarchy of values than any single topic. The first dispute concerned the period of the Polish People's Republic. The second concerned the economic and social model of the Third Republic of Poland. The third division, which has not yet been explicitly named in major campaigns and has been going on for five years, concerns Poland's membership in the European Union. Despite this, for the first time since 1989, only one side of the dispute has seen the emergence of charismatic leaders. If the meta-dispute is not to turn into a meta-failure, it is necessary for an inspiring and charismatic leader to emerge on the pro-European side.
The first meta-theme of the Third Republic of Poland was the division between post-Solidarity and post-communists. The entire 1990s, until 2004, were dominated by this division. It was largely a division into two political blocs: the AWS (formerly SKL, ZChN, and a dozen other parties) together with the UW (formerly UD and KLD) on one side, and the SLD (formerly SdPR) on the other. This division was so strong that only the discussion on abortion heated up public debate as much as the arguments on decommunization. However, even the division on abortion largely revolved around the post-Solidarity and post-communist axis. The result of these disputes and this dividing line was the now unpopular “abortion compromise.”
The second division was between Solidary Poland and Liberal Poland, introduced by Jarosław Kaczyński during the 2004 campaign. Similar to the division in the 1990s, this division crystallized around two political blocs: PiS and PO. From an ideological point of view, this dispute ended five years ago when PO accepted and incorporated into its program most of PiS's economically illiberal (non-free market) demands, which were “solidary” in nature.
The existing system of financing political parties – which did not exist in the 1990s – reinforces the organizational division of the political scene. Therefore, even though the ideological dispute has long since turned to ashes, nothing has changed in terms of party logos. Although the PO and PiS remain, their leaders – both Kaczyński and Tusk – are leaving the scene, along with the division between a solidary and a liberal Poland.
We are entering an era of a new division, one that has not yet been clearly named in any campaign. This division is ideological and dominates discussions, similar to previous rifts. As the third meta-division in the history of the Republic of Poland since 1989, it ranks higher in the hierarchy of values than any other dispute, with the possible exception of abortion, which continues to stir up emotions as it did in the 1990s. This division concerns Poland's presence in the EU.
The division between post-Solidarity and post-communists was presented as a division between heroes and traitors; between those looking to the past and those looking to the future. The division between solidary and liberal Poland was drawn as a division between those who care about the fate of provincial Poland (labelled as “Poland B”) and those from large metropolises; those with heart and those with head; those who succeeded and those who lost out during the economic transformation of the 1990s.
The current division will also be described in various ways – as a division between those who see Poland as part of the West and those who see it as part of the East; between the Poland of human rights and the Poland of majority rights; between patriots and traitors. However, this is undoubtedly the most important division of the next 15-20 years. During this time, Poland will become a net payer to the EU, which will contribute to the heated debate. We are a society with a declining birth rate and increasing life expectancy, and thus a growing number of citizens requiring care and a declining generational replacement rate. Maintaining the current standard of living and prosperity will require an influx of immigrants, which will lead to discussions about difficult at times cultural assimilation.
Ukraine's potential entry into the EU will be for wealthy and aging Poland what Poland's entry into the European community was for wealthy and aging France and Germany: an opportunity for companies and a threat to workers. The debate over the new constitution—a topic that sparked controversy when I introduced it in June 2023, but which has since been accepted as an inevitable necessity—will bring this dispute into sharp relief.
Although 70% of Poles support the European Union, this is not reflected in the charisma of their political representatives. Opponents of the EU and Poland's membership in it already have their leaders. Czarnek, Nawrocki, and Bosak will dominate the anti-EU side. The pro-EU side does not yet have a leader. Sooner or later, someone with the charisma of Tusk, Kaczyński, or Czarnek will be needed on the pro-European side if the meta-dispute is not to turn into a meta-failure—both political and civilizational. The clock is ticking.
